

### Public Protective Actions:

#### Decision-Making in the Field

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To provide an overview of the decision-making process used by emergency responders in evaluating and selecting PPA options.



- Define the following terms and their significance in protecting the public:
  - Public Protective Actions (PPA)
  - Evacuation
  - Protection-in-Place (PIP)
- Define the following terms and their significance in PPA decision-making:
  - Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL)
  - Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG)



## Objectives (continued)

- Describe criteria for evaluating Protection-in-Place as a PPA option and guidelines / procedures for its implementation.
- Describe criteria for evaluating Evacuation as a PPA option and guidelines / procedures for its implementation.



### The Eight Step Process

- 1. Site Management and Control
- 2. Identify the Problem
- 3. Hazard and Risk Evaluation
- 4. Select Personal protective Clothing and Equipment
- 5. Information Management / Resource Coordination
- 6. Implement Response Objectives
- 7. Decontamination
- 8. Terminate the Incident



## Site Management & Control

- Managing the physical layout of the emergency
- Separate people from the problem
- Can't safely manage the incident if you don't have control of the scene



### Site Management & Control

#### Site Management Tasks

- Assume command of the incident
- Safe approach & positioning
- Establish Staging, as necessary
- Establish Isolation Perimeter around site
- Establish Hazard Control Zones
- Size-up need for immediate rescue and initial Public Protective Actions



## Site Management & Control

#### Public Protective Actions

- Objective: To protect employees and general public from actual or potential harm.
- Implemented after Isolation Perimeter is established and Hazard Control Zones defined.
- ◆ Tactical Options:
  - Evacuation
  - Sheltering-in-Place
  - Combination



#### **Observations**

- ◆ There are no clear "black & white" criteria, but alot of gray areas.
- ◆ Guidelines should not be viewed as a replacement for the IC's view and assessment of the incident scene.
- ◆ PIP and evacuation are not mutually exclusive options, but are often implemented simultaneously and in conjunction with each other.



#### **Evaluation Factors**

- → Hazmat(s) involved.
- Population at Risk.
- ◆ Time factors involved in the release.
- Effects of present and projected meteorological conditions upon control / movement of release.
- Ability to communicate with population at risk.
- ♦ Ability of responders to implement, control, monitor and terminate the protective action.



#### Exposure Values

- Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL)
- Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG)
- ◆ Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH)
- ◆ TLV / Short Term Exposure Level (STEL)
- ◆ TLV / Ceiling (C)
- → TLV / Time Weighted Average (TWA)



## Acute Exposure Guideline Levels

- Developed by EPA National Advisory Committee for AEGL's for Hazardous Substances
- Represent ceiling exposure values for general population exposure to acutely toxic HM.
- Developed for four exposure periods: 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours.



## Acute Exposure Guideline Levels

- ◆ AEGL-1 = Airborne concentration above which the general population could experience notable discomfort.
- ◆ AEGL-2 = Airborne concentration above which the general population could experience irreversible or otherwise serious effects or impaired ability to escape.
- ◆ AEGL-3 = Airborne concentration above which the general population could experience life-threatening effects or death.



## Chlorine AEGL's

|        | <u> 30 Min.</u> | <u> 1 Hour</u> | <u>4 Hours</u> | <u>8 Hours</u> |
|--------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| AEGL-1 | 1 ppm           | 1 ppm          | 0.5 ppm        | 0.5 ppm        |
| AEGL-2 | 3 ppm           | 2 ppm          | 1 ppm          | 0.7 ppm        |
| AEGL-3 | 31 ppm          | 22 ppm         | 11 ppm         | 8 ppm          |



## Emergency Response Plng Guideline

- Developed by American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA).
- ◆ There are three designations (ERPG-1, ERPG-2, ERPG-3).
- Developed for 1 hour exposure periods.
- Definitions parallel those of AEGL's.



## Emergency Response Plng Guideline

- ◆ ERPG-1 = Concentration below which one could be exposed without experiencing other than mild, transient adverse health effects.
- ◆ ERPG-2 = Concentration below which one could be exposed without experiencing irreversible or otherwise serious effects that could impair one's ability to take protective action.
- ◆ ERPG-3 = Concentration below which one could be exposed without experiencing life-threatening health effects.



### Chlorine ERPG's vs. AEGL's

#### One-Hour Exposure Comparison

• ERPG-1 1 ppm

• ERPG-2 3 ppm

• ERPG-3 20 ppm

AEGL-1 1 ppm

AEGL-2 2 ppm

AEGL-3 22 ppm



#### **Decision-Making Resources**

- Pre-Incident Planning.
- Hazards analysis / consequence analysis process.
- ◆ NAERG Table of Initial Isolation and Protective Action Distances.
- → Plume dispersion models (e.g., Aloha, Safer).
- Air monitoring results
- "Street smarts" and experience.



#### The Facts

- Staying indoors can provide a safe haven during a release.
- ◆ The older the building the less effective shelter it will provide (>1 hour).
- Sustained, continuous releases will eventually filter into a structure and endanger the occupants.
- PIP is not the best option if the vapors are flammable.



#### The Facts (continued)

- Weather conditions can have a positive or negative impact upon PIP effectiveness.
- ◆ HVAC systems may carry vapors into a structure before the public is warned.
- When PIP is terminated, public must be advised to "open up" their structures.



#### Types of Structures (Rated by Energy Efficiency)

- ◆ Type 1 Energy efficient; constructed after 1970.
- → Type 2 Modern construction built 1950 to 1970.
- ◆ Type 3 Oldest construction built 1920 to 1950.
- Type 4 Mobile homes, trailers, sheds, etc.
  regardless of age.



#### **Applicable Scenarios**

- Release forms "puff" or migrating plume vs. continuous point source release.
- HM has been totally released from its container and is dissipating.
- Fast-moving toxic vapor cloud will quickly impact exposed people.
- Short duration solid or liquid leaks.



#### Applicable Scenarios (continued)

- Migrating vapor cloud of known low toxicity and quantity.
- ◆ Leaks can be rapidly controlled at their source by either engineered suppression or mitigation systems, or through emergency response operations.



#### Critical Success Factors

- Knowledge of HM behavior, containers and facility.
- Knowledge of types of structures in the community.
- Public have trust and confidence in responders and/or facility.
- Public has practiced and is a "player."



#### The Facts

- Categorized as limited-scale or full-scale.
- Public safety does it every day limited scale.
- → Full-scale evacuations are difficult at best!!!
- Regardless of your decision, there will be no shortage of critics.



## Limited-Scale Evacuation

#### **Applicable Scenarios**

- → HM is released inside a structure and is confined.
- → Flammables, explosives or reactives are involved and can explode.
- Leaks involving toxic materials cannot be controlled and are expected to continue to leak.
- ◆ IC determines the leak cannot be controlled and the public is at risk.



## Full-Scale Evacuation

#### **Applicable Scenarios**

- Large leaks involving flammable or toxic gases from bulk containers or process units.
- ◆ Large quantities of HM which could explode, causing damage to additional structures, process units, etc.
- Releases which are difficult to control and which could increase in size or duration.
- ◆ IC determines the leak cannot be controlled and the public is at risk.



## Full-Scale Evacuation

#### Evacuation Management

- ◆ *Alerting* alert the public; tell them what to do.
- → Transportation move people to a safer location outside the area of risk.
- ◆ *Relocation* keep them housed, comfortable,
- ◆ Information keep them informed of your progress and of the situation.



## Full-Scale Evacuation

#### **Public Alerting**

- ◆ There is no one best way to alert the public.
- Options

Personal Notifications

Tone Alerted Radios

Scanner Radio

Sirens / Alarms

PA System

EBS / EAS

TV Capture System

CT/NS



#### **Acutely Toxic Materials**

- ♦ ≤ ERPG-1 = No PPA required
- ◆ Between ERPG-1 and ERPG-2 = Recommend sheltering-in-place.
- ◆ Between ERPG-2 and ERPG-3 = Sheltering recommended unless situation worsens and (1) airborne concentrations approach ERPG-3, and/or (2) there is insufficient time / resources to control the emergency.



#### **Acutely Toxic Materials**

◆ ≥ ERPG-3 = Evacuation preferred unless (1) there is insufficient time before release impacts area, and/or (2) it would place ERP or public at greater risk.



#### Flammable Liquids and Gases

- ◆ No health hazard (e.g., LPG, methane).
- ◆ 10% of LEL used as basis of PPA decision-making.
- ◆ Evacuation preferred unless (1) there is insufficient time before release impacts area, and/or (2) it would place ERP or public at greater risk.



#### Flammable Liquids / Gases (Secondary Health Hazard)

- Example: toluene, xylene.
- Initial priority to flammability, with secondary priority to health hazard.
- → HOWEVER: Health hazard may exist with certain FL / FG at concentrations below the LEL.



#### Flammable Liquids / Gases (Secondary Health Hazard)

- ◆ If ERPG's are GREATER than LEL, use 10% of LEL used as basis of PPA decision-making.
- ◆ If ERPG's are LESS than LEL, use PPA action guidelines for acutely toxic materials.



#### **Chronic Hazard Chemicals**

- Example: benzene, butadiene
- Initial priority to flammability, with secondary priority to chronic health hazard.
- ◆ HOWEVER: Chronic health hazard may exist with certain FL / FG at concentrations below the LEL.



#### **Chronic Hazard Chemicals**

- ◆ If ERPG's are GREATER than LEL, use 10% of LEL used as basis of PPA decision-making.
- ◆ If ERPG's are LESS than LEL, use PPA action guidelines for acutely toxic materials.



#### **Lessons Learned**

- Knowledge of the HM and/or facility through planning and hazards analysis is critical.
- An Incident Command organization is essential in ensuring coordination between the EOC, Command Post and field personnel.
- Establish priorities and be realistic in your expectations.



#### Lessons Learned (continued)

- Public must have trust and confidence in the responders.
- Public needs information in a timely manner and needs to be kept informed throughout the emergency.
- What works well at 12:00 noon may be a disaster at 12:00 midnight.



## SUMMARY